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Abstract 
It is widely recognized that the agricultural sector, in addition to private goods, produces 
public goods that benefit the domestic consumers. The prime example is cultural landscape 
which is produced jointly with private agricultural goods.  
 In order for policy to be optimal it should be directed towards resolving market failures 
caused by the existence of public goods. Using a public good modeling framework, we develop 
supply- and willingness to pay functions for cultural landscape. Governmental agricultural 
support is adjusted to achieve efficient supply of the public good. Thereafter we illustrate how 
this can be achieved in a computable general equilibrium model. We show that efficient supply 
of cultural landscape can be achieved even with a tremendous reduction in overall support of 
agricultural production. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Most of the industrialized countries support their domestic agricultural sector, both by 
budget support and by protectionism. Norway is an example. Norwegian farmers received 
65 percent of their income from governmental support in 2006, according to OECD 
(2007).  From a theoretical point of view this support can only be justified if it corrects for 
a market failure. It is often assumed that the agricultural sector produces public goods or 
externalities that benefit the domestic consumers, in addition to the sector’s production of 
private agricultural goods. Brunstad, Gaasland and Vårdal (1995, 1999 and 2005) 
describes amenity value of landscape, food security and maintenance of population in 
remote areas as central public goods supplied by the Norwegian agricultural sector. If 
domestic agricultural production causes market failures of this sort, the government should 
provide subsidies to remedy these failures.  
 This article focuses on the agricultural sector as a supplier of cultural landscape. Its 
main contribution is that it provides a framework for modelling supply and demand for 
cultural landscape in a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) framework. We assume 
that land used in the agricultural sector has a dual value, one as input in the agricultural 
production and one as output of cultural landscape. When farmers optimize their input of 
land they do not take the consumer preferences for cultural landscape into consideration. 
By including a marginal willingness to pay for cultural landscape valuation in the private 
consumers’ utility function we can determine the magnitude of both the consumers’ 
marginal amenity benefits and the agricultural sectors conditional demand for land. 
Socially optimal supply of cultural landscape production occurs when the sum of the 
agents’ marginal benefits of farmland equals the marginal costs of cultural landscape 
production. We allow the government to resolve any inefficient supplies of cultural 
landscape by financing the provision of the public good through subsidizing the use of land 
in the agricultural sector. When subsidies are directed towards resolving the problem of 
inefficient supply of cultural landscape it will internalize the benefits. This will lead to an 
efficient level of agricultural support.  
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 The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss supply and 
demand for cultural landscape in a figure framework. In Section 3, we describe how we 
can incorporate the supply- and willingness to pay function for cultural landscape in a 
CGE framework, and how an endogenous subsidy can be used to secure efficient supply of 
cultural landscape. In Section 4, we illustrate the supply and demand for cultural landscape 
in a CGE model for Norway. This is done to illustrate how the level and direction of 
agricultural support will change while directing it towards securing efficient supply of 
cultural landscape. The programming is done using the MPSGE syntax. Section 5 offers 
concluding remarks.  
 
2.  EFFICIENT SUPPLY OF CULTURAL LANDSCAPE 
Attempts to model the multifunctionality of agricultural production is scarce. The nearest 
related articles in this field deals with applied CGE analysis regarding the reform of Swiss’ 
agricultural policy, see Cretegny (2002a and 2002b). His analysis does not discriminate 
between various public goods produced by the agricultural sector, but describes a link 
between ecological and non-intensive farming and the production of public goods. 
Cretegny postulates a joint output CET function for the agricultural sector. The farmers 
must choose among producing a private good by intensive farming or producing a public 
good by converting to more non-intensive farming. The farmers receive governmental 
direct payments decoupled from the level of output, in exchange for producing the public 
good. 
 We focus on the supply and demand for cultural landscape. The crucial assumption in 
our model framework is that the amount of land used as input in the agricultural sector is 
equal to the output of cultural landscape in the economy. A discrepancy between 
agricultural sector’s demand for land and the social optimal supply of cultural landscape 
may occur in absence of governmental interventions. This is captured by Figure 1, where 
the amount of farm land in agricultural production is set from agricultural sector’s cost 
minimization without subsidies or other distortion implemented. Quantity of farmland is 
denoted L while the market price in the farm land market is denoted wL. The supply curve 
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for agricultural land is determined by the marginal costs of using land in agricultural 
production, denoted MC. The marginal cost of farmland is determined by the alternative 
value of using land for other purposes
1
. The marginal cost of using land in the agricultural 
sector is increasing and reflects that there is a given endowment of land in the economy, 
such that an increase of farmland can only take place by bidding land away from other 
sectors. Notice that the marginal costs of farmland is equivalent to marginal costs of 
cultural landscape production. This is a result of our dual value assumption. 
 Figure 1 depicts the market solution, where the agricultural sector demands the amount 
LA of land to the price 
0
Lw . However, the social optimal amount of cultural landscape 
production is the amount L
*
. At this level of landscape the marginal costs equal the sum of 
marginal benefits of the two agents: agricultural sector’s conditional factor demand, CFDA, 
and the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for cultural landscape, MWP. The 
inefficient supply of cultural landscape depicted in Figure 1 can be resolved by 
governmental interventions. The goal then becomes to direct the support directly towards 
correction of the market failure. This is done by subsidizing land used in the agricultural 
sector. In Figure 2 we apply traditional tax analysis to illustrate correction of the market 
failure. For simplicity we assume a constant subsidy per unit of agricultural land. The 
subsidy is adapted such that the agricultural sector uses L
*
 units of land as input. The level 
of support is then determined by the distance between the market price, *Lw  , and 
agricultural sector’s willingness to pay for L* units. As shown by Figure 2, and later shown 
formally, this level of support is equal to the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay, 
PMWP, for L
* 
units of cultural landscape. The Samuelson rule for optimal supply of a public 
good states that there will be an efficient supply of a public good when the sum of all 
agents’ marginal willingness to pay for the public good equals the marginal costs of 
providing the good. This condition is consequently satisfied in the farmland market 
described in Figure 2.  
                                                          
1. The alternative use of Norwegian farmland is forestry.  
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 Our assumption that the applied amount of farmland is equal to the output of cultural 
landscape might seem a bit restrictive. But, as the model results in Section 4 illustrates, this 
assumption will give us desirable model features. 
 
                  
Figure 1: Inefficient provision of agricultural land   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Efficient provision of agricultural land 
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The reason is that if total domestic agricultural production decreases due to increased 
competition from abroad, the agricultural sector becomes more land intensive as the 
government will increase the land subsidy to maintain an efficient supply of cultural 
landscape. We will not face a corner solution where agricultural sector produces solely 
with land input. This cannot be the case as there is need for other inputs for cultivating the 
farmland and create the amenity benefits for the consumers. Our model framework allows 
that the social optimal amount of farmland is determined. The type of farming, i.e. 
agriculture’s input mix, is determined from agricultural sector’s cost minimization. 
 
3. SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR CULTURAL LANDSCAPE 
In the previous section we illustrated supply and demand in the market for cultural 
landscape, and described further how an inefficient allocation in the market can be 
counteracted by use of land subsidies. We will in this section describe how the analysis can 
be adapted to a CGE model framework. Our public good supply framework is rooted in a 
model layout formulated by Markusen and Rutherford (1995) and further described in 
Rutherford (1999). Our framework differs from Markusen and Rutherford’s layout in three 
significant ways. Rutherford (1999) includes a sector “GP,” a Leontief technology2 which 
converts private goods inputs into a public good, in his model. It is assumed that the 
private goods inputs are perfectly mobile between the public good sector and the other 
sectors, which produce private goods. In our model, the production of the public good is 
similar to the input of land in agricultural sector. We assume that no other inputs directly 
contribute to the production of the public good. Next we look at the consumers’ valuations 
of the public good. Rutherford (1999) introduces personalized markets for the public good. 
Each of the consumers is endowed with the total output of the public good in the economy. 
This means that each of the consumers is supplied with the total production of the public 
good, which is what we will expect from the characteristics of a public good. The 
consumer income encompasses then both private and public endowments. By setting a 
consumer’s valuation of public good demand equal to his or her endowment, the 
                                                          
2. Note that a MPSGE model is built by using constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production- and 
utility functions. The Leontief production function is a special case of the CES function. 
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consumer’s budget constraint will be unaffected. The consumers’ marginal willingness to 
pay for the public good is accordingly expressed through the commodity prices in the 
personalized markets. Rutherford’s model imposes no restrictions on the price setting in 
the personalized markets. We are interested in linking the consumers’ marginal willingness 
to pay for the amenity benefits of the cultural landscape production to previous studies. By 
using a price-adjustment instrument
3
 we allow the marginal willingness to pay for cultural 
landscape to be determined by a utility function postulated by Lopez et al. (1994). 
Finally we look at efficient provision of the public good. In Rutherford (1999) it is 
assumed that the government uses tax income to purchase the public good, in order to 
finance an efficient supply of this commodity. In our framework this implicates that the 
government is bidding land away from the agricultural sector, which cannot be the fact. To 
gain realism to our model layout we allow the government to finance the provision of the 
public good through subsidizing the use of land in the agricultural sector. 
 
A. Supply 
In our CGE model the private consumers have endowments of land which they rent to the 
production sectors. Their total endowment, denoted M, constitutes the supply of land in the 
economy. Land is assumed to be perfectly mobile between the production sectors. Land 
used as input in the agricultural sector is denoted MA, while land used as input in the rest of 
the economy is denoted MO. Land used as input in the agricultural sector constitutes the 
total supply of cultural landscape in the economy. To model this relationship we include an 
agricultural land sector and a cultural landscape commodity in our CGE model. The 
agricultural land sector produces the cultural landscape commodity, denoted L, by using 
land as input. The CES production function for cultural landscape is defined as: 
 
(1)     ρ
1
ρ
A1 MaL  , 
 
                                                          
3. See Rutherford [6] for a description of possible uses of auxiliary variables. 
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where MA = M-MO. The cultural landscape variable is used as an intermediate commodity 
and is used as an input in agricultural production. The expanded model is calibrated such 
that the agricultural sector applies total output of cultural landscape as input in benchmark. 
The relationship between the output of cultural landscape in the agricultural land sector 
and the input of cultural landscape in agricultural sector is conditioned by the market 
clearance condition, underlying the MPSGE modeling structure.
4
  
 
B. Demand 
Having described the supply for cultural landscape we now turn to the determinants of 
demand for cultural landscape. Following Rutherford (1999) we introduce personalized 
markets for the public good, endowing each consumer with the total output of cultural 
landscape from the agricultural land sector by using a quantity adjustment instrument. 
Notice that our framework differs from Rutherford’s model in that we apply only one 
representative consumer for modeling the demand in the economy. The representative 
consumer’s income, denoted I, encompasses now both incomes from primary factors 
rented to the production sectors and the consumer value of the public good. The amount of 
cultural landscape in the economy is determined by L from (1). Let w be a vector of factor 
prices net of tax and E be a vector of endowments of f primary factors. Then the 
representative consumer’s income can be written as (2).  
 
(2)   
f
MWPff ,LPEwI  f=1,…..,F.    
 
                                                          
4. An Arrow-Debreu model can be solved as a complimentary problem by using three equilibrium 
conditions. The marked clearance condition states that there cannot be excess demand in any commodity 
market. Rutherford [6] writes this condition as: 
    


h h
h
Mp
ih
d
ih
j i
p
p
j
y j ),(
)(
  
     By Shephard’s lemma, the first sum is the net supply of good i by the production sectors. The second sum 
is the consumers aggregated initial endownment of good i. These two sums represent aggregated supply of 
good i. The right hand side represents aggregated demand for good i. 
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The marginal valuation of the cultural landscape commodity, denoted PMWP, is the market 
price in the personalized commodity market. The market clearance condition for this 
market states that the consumer’s Marshallian demand for cultural landscape, the optimal 
demand for given prices and level of income, cannot exceed supply of the cultural 
landscape commodity. The market price in the personalized commodity market is set 
without any distortion in Rutherford’s (1999) framework. We want a more restricted price 
setting in our model, since the market price, PMWP, represents the consumer’s marginal 
willingness to pay for cultural landscape. This is done by allowing the market price to be 
endogenously determined from the willingness to pay function, described in Section C. 
The price setting is controlled by a price adjustment instrument that works through 
imposing an endogenous tax on the consumer’s purchase of cultural landscape. This will 
cause the buyer price of cultural landscape to become (1+t)PMWP where t is the ad valorem 
rate of the tax. Assume for simplicity two private goods: an agricultural commodity, A, and 
the other commodity, O, with corresponding prices denoted PA and PO , respectively. This 
is similar to the structure of the CGE model applied in Section 4. Supply of cultural 
landscape is represented by (1). The market clearance condition for the CES demand 
function can then be written as (3).  (3) shows that an increase in t will decrease the 
demand for L, ceteris paribus. The clearance condition will then cause market price PMWP 
to decrease to maintain market clearance. This mechanism allows the market price in the 
personalized commodity market to adapt according to the marginal willingness to pay 
function. 
 
 (3) 
 
     rA
r
O
r
MWP
1r
MWP
PPP)t1(
IP)t1(
L




, 
 
where 
1ρ
ρ
r

 .   
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C. Calibrating the amenity benefit function 
In this paragraph we show how an amenity benefit function, postulated by Lopez, Shah and 
Altobello (1994), can be incorporated in our model. The calibration and application of the 
function is based on Brunstad, Gaasland and Vårdal (1999). The function will be the 
determinant of marginal willingness to pay in the personalized commodity market. In lack 
of more relevant data, the function will be calibrated by using results from a contingent 
valuation study from Sweden, see Drake (1992). This will of course create some 
controversy regarding the results, but we apply this data more as an illustration. For a more 
thorough discussion of the controversy of applying the Swedish study for valuing 
Norwegian cultural landscape, see Brunstad, Gaasland and Vårdal (1999). 
Lopez, Shah and Altobello (1994) postulate the amenity benefits of agricultural land as a 
function of the Cobb Douglas form. The amenity benefits are determined by amount of 
land used in agricultural production, population and income per capita. Population is 
denoted P while income per capita is denoted Y. We know from (1) that amount of land 
used as input in the agricultural sector is similar to output of cultural landscape, denoted L. 
 
(4)  321
εεε
YPBLWTP   
 
 B is a constant and the exponents describe elasticities. Lopez, Shah and Altobello (1994) 
arrived at the estimates ε1= 0.172, ε2 = 0.796 and ε3 = 3.877. The estimate for income 
elasticity indicates that cultural landscape is a luxury good, while the elasticity for 
population indicates that the amenity benefits are strongly dependent on the size of the 
population. Cultural landscape is then close to being a pure public good. The elasticity ε1 
implies that marginal willingness to pay for cultural landscape is strongly decreasing in 
input of land in the agricultural sector. By taking the derivative with respect to L in (4) and 
including the income- and population parameter in the constant, we find the marginal 
willingness to pay function for cultural landscape. This function is similar to the non-linear 
function MWP depicted in Figure 1 and 2. To make notation consistent with the previous 
section, we denote marginal willingness to pay as PMWP. 
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(5)  1ε1MWP
1LBεP     
 
where 32
εε
YBPB  . 
Drake’s (1992) contingent valuation study is compounded of one main survey with 1089 
persons interviewed in all parts of Sweden, and two smaller follow-up surveys with 152 
and 49 participants in Uppsala county. The participants were asked how much they were 
willing to pay in income taxes per year, to avoid half of the total Swedish agricultural area 
becoming cultivated by spruce. Total willingness to pay for maintaining half of the total 
agricultural land added up to 3.365 billion SEK/year. We apply this value as a reference 
for calibrating the marginal willingness to pay function from (5). Assuming that total 
Norwegian agricultural land adds up to L
*
 in Figure 2, the area under the MWP curve 
between L
*
 and L
*
/2 must add up to 3.365 billion. This allows us to find the unknown 
constant B  in (5). 
 
(6)    365.3
2
L
BLB
1
1
ε
*
ε* 





    
 
Having determined the constant B  our next task is to implement the marginal willingness 
to pay function in our CGE model. We exploit the market clearance condition from (3). By 
using the price adjustment instrument described in Section B we allow the market price in 
the personalized commodity market to be determined by the marginal willingness to pay 
function from (5). Notice that the willingness to pay function represents national 
willingness to pay for cultural landscape. This is the reason for using only one 
representative consumer in our model framework, not including government.  
 Using the endogenous tax method offers a simple way of implementing the willingness 
to pay function in the CGE framework. A word of caution should be added. Imposing a tax 
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in the personalized commodity market will lead to an inefficient adjustment, as the tax will 
create a discrepancy between the user price and the market price in the commodity market.  
 
D. Optimal subsidy rule 
We will now describe the government’s role in supporting an efficient supply of cultural 
landscape. We have altered Rutherford’s efficiency condition to suit our model framework. 
In Rutherford’s framework the government secures an efficient supply of the public good 
by using their tax revenue to purchase an efficient amount of the public good. A more 
suitable assumption is that the government subsidizes the use of land in the agricultural 
sector. The subsidy rate, s, is endogenously set to satisfy the Samuelson condition: The 
sum of the marginal benefits of farmland equal the marginal costs of cultural landscape 
production. We have shown that two agents benefit from the production of the agricultural 
land sector, namely the agricultural sector and the representative consumer. Optimal 
supply must reflect the valuation of the two agents. This leads to the optimal allocation 
depicted in Figure 2. The aim of the government’s policy is consequently to maintain 
equality in (7). The sum of the consumer- and agriculture’s marginal willingness to pay is 
set equal to the market price for farmland, i.e. the marginal costs of cultural landscape 
production. The market price for farmland subtracted by the subsidy must reflect 
agriculture’s willingness to pay for the given amount of land, as shown by Figure 2.  
 
(7)    LLMWP wswP   
 
From (7) it follows that s= PMWP. This shows that the support of agricultural production 
must be efficient in the model, and that it so will internalize the benefits of the private 
consumers. 
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4. MODELLING EFFICIENT SUPPLY OF CULTURAL LANDSCAPE 
We intend to apply our model framework in a recently updated CGE model for Norway. This 
modelling is not complete. As a preliminary illustration we report the results from NORJORD, 
which is an aggregated static small open economy model. This model is a revised version of the 
model found in Rødseth (2007).  The benchmark reflects Norway’s national accounts in 1996, but 
the model simplifies the economy to a large extent. Agricultural production is singled out in an 
aggregated production sector while the rest of the domestic production is represented by a pooled 
sector.  Norwegian agriculture is a heavily subsidized industry. Its support can in broad terms be 
labelled as governmental- and market price support, but the overall composition of the support is 
complex, e.g. the production is protected to a large degree by import quotas with tariffs on certain 
products while producers receive both production dependent-  and production neutral governmental 
subsidies. NORJORD simplifies this complex support regime: The budget support is given solely 
as exogenous price support while protectionism is modelled through a single exogenous tariff on 
all imports of agricultural goods. It is assumed an initial budget support that constitutes 45 percent 
of domestic agricultural production while initial tariff is set equal to 400 percent, implying no 
import of agricultural goods initially. This is done to focus on domestic produced goods for which 
import is restricted. These simplifications will lead to debatable results. Even so, the preliminary 
results give a good indication on how our cultural landscape framework can be applied for policy 
modelling.  
NORJORD is calibrated such that the amount of cultural landscape is determined by agricultural 
sector’s profit maximization initially, i.e. the endogenous land subsidy, s, is set equal to zero 
initially. This allow for comparing the social efficient supply of cultural landscape with supply 
resulting from no governmental interventions directed towards agriculture’s input of farmland. We 
calculate three counterfactual scenarios. The first scenario illustrates the alteration in domestic 
production of agricultural goods when initial exogenous support is unaltered but we also allow for 
efficient land subsidy. The second and third scenario assume that the exogenous support is 
removed, and describes the scenarios of no governmental support and of efficient support, 
respectively. The model results are reported in Table 1. When implementing the optimal subsidy 
rule we now encounter a situation similar to the illustration in Figure 2. This will imply a positive 
subsidizing of land input in the agricultural sector. The increase in land support will lead to a 
relatively more land intensive agricultural production. We see that supply of cultural landscape by 
far exceeds initial supply of cultural landscape in scenarios representing efficient supply of cultural 
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landscape. This is expected as the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay exceeds agricultural 
sector’s marginal valuation of farmland initially. Agricultural sector’s valuation is set by Harberger 
normalization while the consumer’s initial marginal willingness to pay is set equal to 3.14. 
In the counterfactual experiments where the overall exogenous agricultural support is removed 
Norwegian agricultural sector experiences a downscaling because of increased competition from 
abroad. The central scenario is when the exogenous support is removed but we allow for efficient 
land subsidy. In this scenario the sector becomes more land intensive than in other scenarios, even 
though the sector’s output has decreased significantly. We interpret this as that the sector transform 
from a food-production oriented role to a cultural landscape-oriented role, due to the use of 
efficient land subsidy. This scenario shows that the goal of maintaining efficient supply of cultural 
landscape can be achieved at a much less level of support than the initial level.  
 
Table 1: Results from model experiments in NORJORD (Values in million NOK) 
 
  BENCHMARK NO EXOGENOUS SUPPORT 
AGRICULTURE  s = 0 s = PMWP s = 0 s = PMWP 
 Domestic 21687.0 21703.3 7248.1 7568.1 
 Import . . 14206.2 13868.8 
DOMESTIC INPUTA      
 Cultural land 181.4 
(0.58%) 
724.7 
(2.27%) 
57.0 
(0.53%) 
722.5 
(6.08%) 
 Labor 7944.0 
(25.23%) 
7935.3 
(24.81%) 
2455.3 
(22.75%) 
2563.7 
(21.57%) 
 Capital 10656.6 
(33.85%) 
10644.9 
(33.28%) 
3304.2 
(30.61%) 
3450.0 
(29.02%) 
 Other 12701.0 
(40.34%) 
12685.7 
(39.65%) 
4978.2 
(46.12%) 
5151.1 
(43.33%) 
SUPPORT      
 Efficient land 
support 
. 722.5 . 722.5 
 Budget support 9796 9803.2 . . 
 Boarder measure . . . . 
Percentages shows share of total input mix. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have presented a framework for calibrating supply- and willingness to pay 
functions for cultural landscape in a CGE model. To illustrate the method, the Norwegian 
agricultural sector is used as a case study. We find that the market failure caused by agricultural 
sector’s cultural landscape production can be resolved with a much less overall support than the 
present level of support of Norwegian agriculture. The reason is that the support now is directed 
towards securing an efficient supply of cultural landscape. Efficient support will transform the 
agricultural sector’s primary focus towards production of cultural landscape rather than 
production of private goods. Our discussion leaves out other multifunctional aspects of 
agricultural production, such that a higher overall support than indicated by Table 1 can be 
justified by public good arguments. Even so the present level of support seems to be overshooting 
the goal of correcting for such market failures. 
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It is widely recognized that the agricultural sector, in addition to private goods, 
produces public goods that benefit the domestic consumers. The prime example is 
cultural landscape which is produced jointly with private agricultural goods. 
 
In order for policy to be optimal it should be directed towards resolving market 
failures caused by the existence of public goods. Using a public good modeling 
framework, we develop supply- and willingness to pay functions for cultural land-
scape. Governmental agricultural support is adjusted to achieve efficient supply of 
the public good. Thereafter we illustrate how this can be achieved in a computable 
general equilibrium model. We show that efficient supply of cultural landscape can 
be achieved even with a tremendous reduction in overall support of agricultural 
production.
